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CASE NOTES
its judicial responsibility when it acts even in indirect contraven-
tion of that law. 69 Furthermore, although it is not the court's gen-
eral responsibility to be the keeper of public morality, it is the
court's equitable responsibility to determine, even in the limited
context of a copyright infringement action, what is and what is not
fraudulent." A refusal to accept that responsibility is to allow illegal
conduct to continue, and, as is the case in Belcher, to continue with
the court's blessing. 7 '
The court in Belcher, if it accepts the district court's finding of
fraud with respect to the sixth publication, 72 had a number of
alternative ways to determine whether or not such material should
be protected by copyright. Although its apparent confusion of the
constitutional theory with the clean hands doctrine clouded its
reasoning, its ultimate conclusion appears unsupportable and its
decision is one which compromises the integrity of the judicial
system.
JEAN S. PERWIN
Copyright—Photocopying as Fair Use—Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States.' —Plaintiff, Williams & Wilkins Company, a pub-
lisher of medical journals, brought a copyright infringement action
against the United States. 2 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, through the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Library of
Medicine (NLM), infringed plaintiff's copyrights in four of its medi-
cal journals.
The facts reveal that the government libraries had distributed
the articles free of charge and on a no-return basis. Nevertheless,
they generally enforced their self-imposed regulations of limiting
requests to fifty pages and to a single copy of a journal article. The
utilization of this regulated photocopying resulted in the yearly
69 See note 46 supra.
70 There seems to be a conflict of authority over whether the determination of fraud is
outside the scope of a copyright infringement action. Professor Nimmer states that since an
allegation of fraudulent content necessarily puts in issue facts extraneous to the work itself, it
seems proper to regard such facts as insufficient to constitute a defense in a copyright
infringement action even though it may constitute grounds for rendering the plaintiff liable in
a separate proceeding. M. Nimmer, Copyright § 36, at 146.29 (1973). However, deceptive
and misleading advertising is specifically listed as an affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment in 9 Am. Jur. Trials, Copyright Infringement Litigation § 78, at 383 (1965).
71 486 F.2d at 1090.
72 See note 49 supra.
' 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 2602 (1974).
2 Suit was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970), which provides that in the
event of copyright infringement by the United States "the exclusive remedy of the owner of
such copyright shall be ... recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for
such infringement, including the minimum statutory damages . ." (Emphasis added.)
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distribution of over 200,000 copies of articles in medical and
scientific journals, with the average article being ten pages long. 3
Most of the requests were from government researchers, though
some were from private or commercial organizations.
On the basis of the foregoing facts the Commissioner to the
Court of Claims held that the library's unauthorized photocopying
of plaintiffs copyrighted articles constituted actionable
infringement. 4
 But on review, the Court of Claims reversed the
decision of the Commissioner and HELD: on the basis of all the
elements in the case, the photocopying of copyrighted articles in
medical journals by public, nonprofit government libraries was fair
use, and as such did not amount to an infringement of copyright. 5
This note will analyze the traditional elements of fair use. The
different approaches used by the Commissioner and the reviewing
Court of Claims will then be contrasted in order to determine
future treatment of fair use in light of the "reprographic
revolution "6
The Copyright Act of 19097 is presently being put to the test by
the "reprographic revolution." The outdated Copyright Act is given
present effectiveness through the judicially created doctrine of fair
use. This doctrine has been in existence since 1841, 8 and it has
tempered the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act. 9 Al-
though no mention of fair use is made whatsoever in the statute, the
Copyright Office has recommended statutory recognition of the doc-
trine since 1961. 1 ° Six years later, the House passed a bill for the
general revision of the copyright laws," one of whose provisions
was to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
3
 487 F.2d at 1348-49.
4 Williams Si Wilkens Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679 (Ct. Cl. 1972). See
also Note, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1093 (1972); Note, 51 Texas L. Rev. 137 (1972) for analyses of
the Commissioner's decision.
5 487 F,2d at 1362.
6 Project, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and Computers, 15
U.C.L.A, L. Rev. 931, 950 (1968) thereinafter cited as Project]. The ability to produce single
copies, as distinguished from the need to make multiple copies, is the major feature of the
reprographic revolution. Id. at 941.
17 U.S.C.
	 1 et seq. (1970).
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). "The question,
then, is, whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials, such as the law recognizes as
no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." Id.
9
 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), which provides in part: "Any person entitled thereto .. shall
have the exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work
. . . ." (Emphasis added.]
It' See First Annual Report of the Committee to Investigate Problems Affecting Corn-
munication in Science and Education, 10 Copyright Soc'y Bull. 1, 14-15 (1962).
" H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill before the Senate was S. 543, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
13 H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967). See also Project, supra note 6, at
953.
" 12 Congress was grap-
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pling with a doctrine that is "entirely equitable and is so flexible
as virtually to defy definition." 13
Nevertheless, the courts have come to accept the following
weak definition:
"Fair use" may be defined as a privilege in others than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in
a reasonable manner without his consent. Though techni-
cally an infringement of copyright, it is allowed by law on
the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and
customary. 14
This definition, however, offers little guidance, in that it merely
defines "fair use" as "reasonable and customary." A fact question is
presented, and the judicial considerations have been capsulized by
section 107 of the House bill into four factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.' 5
These four factors were accepted by both the Commissioner 16
and by the Court of Claims on review in Williams & Wilkens. 17 But
after listing the four factors, the two opinions diverged. According
to the Commissioner, "[w]hile these criteria are interrelated and may
vary in relative significance, the last one, i.e., the competitive
character of the use, is often the most important."'" The reviewing
court, however, took a much broader position, and went beyond the
four-fold test:
In addition, the development of "fair use" has been
influenced by some tension between the direct aim of the
copyright privilege to grant the owner a right from which
he can reap financial benefit and the more fundamental
purpose of the protection "To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts." 19
This early divergence in views toward photocopies foretold the
opposing conclusions that would be reached.
All of the factors of fair use enunciated by the House bill in
13 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D,N.Y. 1968).
14 Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 114 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(emphasis added). See also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
306 (2d Cir. 1966); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 17 .2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950).
1 ' H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1967). See also 2 M. Nimmer, Copyright
§ 145, at 646 (1973).
16 172 U.S.P.Q. at 679.
17 487 F.2d at 1352.
18 172 U.S.P.Q. at 679. But see Comment, 1969 Duke L.J, 73, 86-95, which considered
diminution of demand and nature of the use as the primary components of fair use.
19 487 F.2d at 1352 (emphasis added), quoting U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8.
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section 107 measure the tension between economic reward and
unhampered dissemination of knowledge. The latter part of the
balance is reflected primarily by the first two factors, namely, the
purpose of the use and the nature of the copyrighted work. As such,
"the privilege [of fair use] has been applied to works in the fields of
science, law, medicine, history and biography." 2 ° The rationale
behind permitting the fair use privilege in these areas is that the
distribution of such materials would "serve the public interest in the
free dissemination of information and . . . their preparation requires
some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter." 2 '
Nevertheless, the publishers of scientific articles have argued that
because of the very nature of their journals, they are the ones most
hurt by photocopying. 22 The rationale is that since subscription lists
have traditionally been small for a company like Williams & Wil-
kens, the loss of even a few subscribers may force a technical
journal out of business. 23 The argument is basically an economic
one—sufficiency of reward to authors and their publishers—and its
proponents strive for the same goal as do those urging unhampered
dissemination of knowledge.
The interest of copyright owners has been succinctly stated by
the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein: 24
The economic philosophy behind the clause empower-
ing Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful
Arts."25
As a result of this reasoning, the scope of permissible fair use is
20
 Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
21
 Id. At this point it should be noted that no distinction can properly be made between
researchers photocopying for their own use and libraries photocopying material for the
researchers. Here, the libraries are not selling the photocopies at a profit, and the same
purpose behind the photocopying is achieved whether the researchers do it themselves or the
library does it for them. In either event, it has been argued that the library should not be
caught in the middle between the copyright owner and the ultimate user in an infringement
action. Furthermore, the library should not be liable even though library photocopying is not
fair use. Pforzheimer, Historical Perspective on Copyright Law and Fair Use, Reprography
and Copyright Law 18, 32 -33 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Pforzheimerl.
22
 Passano, How Photocopying Pollutes Sci-Tech Publishing, 197 Publishers' Weekly,
63.64 (1970).
23
 Project, supra note 6, at 944. But see Joint Libraries Committee on Fair Use in
Photocopying, Report on Single Copies, 9 Copyright Soc'y Bull. 79, 81 (1962), where the
Committee's findings of fact included a determination that the present demand for photo-
copies can be satisfied without inflicting measurable damage on publishers and copyright
owners. Furthermore, improved copying processes will not materially affect the demand for
single copy library duplication for research purposes. As such, the Committee recommended
that it be library policy to fill an order for a single photocopy of any published work or any
part thereof.
24
 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
25 Id. at 219.
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tempered by the last two factors listed in section 107, namely, the
substantiality of material used and the effect on a copyright owner's
potential market.
The factor of substantiality of material used has received wide
judicial spOnsorship. 26 At the outset it would seem that since a
photocopy makes an exact duplicate, a photocopied article would be
the product of wholesale copying. 27 The reviewing court in Williams
& Wilkens responded by rejecting the dicta in Leon v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. 2 that wholesale copying of a copy-
righted work could never be fair use. The Court concluded that "the
extent of the copying is one important factor, but only one, to be
taken into account, along with several others." 29 As such, it was not
overwhelmed by the more than two million photocopies which
NLM and NIH made in a single year." Instead, because of the vast
numbers served by the photocopies, the court was more influenced
by the libraries' system of limitations which confined the duplication
to the personal use of scientific personne1. 31 In effect, the purpose
and character of the use was permitted to moderate the factor of
substantiality of use, the court being unwilling to adopt a per se rule
of unfair use even in the case of wholesale copying.
The court noted with approval the libraries' policy of restricting
copying to articles of less than fifty pages. 32 Presumably the li-
braries' consideration was economic in nature—it became cheaper to
purchase the entire journal rather than photocopy such a large
number of pages. Precisely this kind of thinking highlights the heart
of this case and future photocopying cases: whether publishers will
in fact be so financially hurt by the reprographic revolution as to
justify a ban on the privilege of fair use surrounding photocopies
altogether.
The issue of financial detriment calls to mind the last of the
four factors of fair use listed in section 107, namely, the effect of the
use on a copyright owner's potential market for his work. The
Commissioner's heavy reliance on this factor33 was grounded on
26 "One cannot copy the substance of another's work without infringing his copyright."
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956), afFd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958). See also
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964); Columbia Pictures Corp.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
27 The Commissioner reached this same conclusion, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 679, and the
reviewing court correctly did not seek to attach a different label.
28 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
29 487 F.2d at 1353. Immediately after stating that "[i]t is not necessary in the case before
us to discuss generally the question of what constitutes 'fair use,' " the court in Leon went on
to say: "Counsel have not disclosed a single authority, nor have we been able to find one,
which lends any support to the proposition that wholesale copying and publication of
copyrighted material can ever be fair use." 91 F,2d at 486.
3° See note 3 and accompanying text supra. The representative year for NIH was 1970,
and 1968 was NLM's representative year.
3 ' 487 F.2d at 1355.
32 Id. at 1354.
33 See text at note 18 supra.
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much judicial authority. 34 Being of the same opinion, the court in
Karll v. Curtis Publishing C0. 35 concluded:
[I]t is safe to say that where the later work differs greatly
in nature, scope, and purpose from the original, a larger
liberty in making quotations and extracts will be permitted
than in cases where the respective works are more or less
competitive. 38
This generally vague standard becomes even further obscured in
that the absence of a competitive or injurious effect will not neces-
sarily make the use fair, especially where a large portion of the
protected work is used. The Ninth Circuit in Leon agreed that
"copyright is property, and an action will lie even if no damage be
shown.""
The state of affairs surrounding the doctrine of fair use is still
"the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 38 A case-by-
case fact determination must always be made, with confident pre-
dictions an impossibility. Somehow all the factors going into fair use
are drawn together. But due to the differing assessments of impor-
tance by the courts, different results can be expected even given the
same set of facts. Such was the case in Williams & Wilkens. Both
the Commissioner and the reviewing court considered the same four
factors listed in section 107. Yet opposite conclusions were reached,
along with a vigorous dissent to the reviewing court's majority
opinion. This note will now examine the difference in approach
used by the Commissioner and the reviewing court. This difference
may well reveal the present thrust of that amorphous conglomerate
called fair use, a thrust not otherwise revealed by the stark factors
listed in section 107 of the House Report.
The Commissioner viewed fair use as a defense to copyright
infringement, with the burden of proof on the defendant. 39 He
rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had the burden
of showing financial harm. Instead, "damage may be inferred in this
case from the fact that the photocopies are intended to supplant the
original articles."" In essence, according to the Commissioner, the
burden was on the defendant to show that there was not any effect
on the copyright owner's potential market, and if there were, that
34
 See cases cited by the Commissioner, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 679. See also 2 M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 145, at 646 (1973) and cases cited therein.
It is believed that the actual decisions bearing upon fair use, if not always their
stated rationale, can best be explained by looking to the central question of whether
the defendant's work tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the
plaintiff's work.
2 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 145, at 646 (1973).
35
 39 F. Supp. 836 (D. Wis. 1941). See also Annot. 23 A.L.R.3d 139, 186-94 (1969).
36
 39 F. Supp. at 837-38.
37 Leon, 91 F.2d at 487.
14
 Deliar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
39
 172 U.S.P.Q. at 678-83.
40
 Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
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such effect was overshadowed by the other considerations of fair
use. Such was the Commissioner's treatment of the fourth factor of
fair use, namely, the effect of the use on a copyright owner's
potential market for his work. Considering the very high importance
placed by the Commissioner on this factor,'" it is not surprising that
the reviewing court's disagreement on this point led to a reversal of
the lower decision.
The reviewing court in Williams & Wilkens concluded that it
was unreasonable to infer financial detriment claimed by the plain-
tiff in light of the defendant's opposing evidence. 42 Quite simply, the
defendants had met their burden of proof in showing that there was
not any detrimental impact on the plaintiff's market. To this extent
the methodology used by the Commissioner and the reviewing court
do not differ, each seeming to place the burden of proof on the
defendant as to each factor of section 107. As such, fair use is treated
as an affirmative defense. It is submitted, however, that language in
the reviewing court's decision indicates that the burden of proof may
in the future by placed on the plaintiff to prove any claimed detri-
mental effect on his potential market:
To us it is very important that plaintiff has failed to
prove its assumption of economic detriment, in the past or
potentially for the future. . . . This is a matter of proof and
plaintiff has not transformed its hypothetical assumption,
by evidence, into a proven fact. . . .
Fusing these elements together, we conclude that
plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant's use of the
copyrighted material has been "unfair," and conversely we
find that these practices have up to now been "fair." 43
Concededly, the reviewing court specifically declined to extend any
views on the situation where the copyright owner is shown to be
hurt by- the photocopying." As . such, no clear statement is made as
to who really has the burden of proof concerning the fourth factor of
section 107—whether the defendant has the burden of proving no
effect, or whether the plaintiff has the burden of proving his claimed
effect. It is submitted that the latter approach is the better and more
fair one, although reputable authors have had differing views.
Typical of this split in views is the contrast between a project
undertaken by the U.C.L.A. Law Review45 and a study by Profes-
sor Breyer of Harvard Law Schoo1. 46 The underlying basis of the
entire Project is its conviction that the publishers of scientific jour-
41 See text at note 18 supra,
42 487 F.2d at 1357.
43 Id. at 1359, 1362.
" Id. at 1362.
43 Project, supra note 6, at 931.
46 Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies
and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Breyer].
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nals suffer a financial detriment as a result of free photocopying. 47
The Project thus reaches a result in agreement with the Commis-
sioner in Williams & Wilkens, and boldly concludes: "We think the
doctrine of fair use, at least as presently construed, ought not
survive the reprographic revolution." 48
 On the other hand, Breyer
would require of publishers a "substantial showing" that additional
fees are in fact needed to maintain continued publication. 49 This is
the identical approach taken by the reviewing court in Williams &
Wilkens when it determined that the plaintiff had not shown that "it
is being or will be harmed substantially . . ." 5° Given the antipodal
views toward the economic effect of photocopying on copyright
owners, it is not surprising that the reviewing court, having sided
with Breyer's view, ultimately also agreed with Breyer's favorable
treatment of fair use. 51
The most significant difference between the Commissioner's
and the reviewing court's treatment of fair use was the latter's
concern over the detriment to medical and scientific research if the
photocopying were held unlawful. 52 In effect, the reviewing court
added a fifth factor to the list of section 107: the detrimental effect to
the public interest of promoting "the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts." 53
 This is not to say that the Commissioner was una-
ware of this public interest," but only that he limited his inquiry
concerning fair use to the four factors listed in section 107. The
reviewing court, however, went further. It stressed that fair use
should be applied in such a way as to recognize the tension between
economic reward and unhampered dissemination of knowledge. 55 In
recognition of this tension, fair use can rightfully be viewed as "a
further limitation, in the public interest, on the limited monopoly
granted by statute to the copyright owner." 56
The underlying tension has surfaced in judicial opinions preced-
ing the Williams & Wilkens decision: "[C]opyright protection is
designed 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' and
Project, supra note 6, at 943-44. "If nothing is done to give them meaningful copyright
protection, scientific and technical journals seem destined to become solely reliant on govern-
ment support." Id. at 946.
48 Id. at 954.
49
 Breyer, supra note 46, at 334.
" 487 F,2d at 1354.
51
 487 F.2d at 1362. Specifically, Breyer advocated:
Congress might simply provide that the copying of periodical publications and
extracts from books by an individual for his own use does not violate the copyright
law provided that he does not make more than one copy within a certain period of
time.
Breyer, supra note 46, at 337.
52 487 F.2d at 1354, 1362.
53
 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. It should be noted that this balancing of harm was not
between plaintiff and defendant, but rather it was between plaintiff and the whole broad area
of medical and scientific research.
54
 See 172 U.S.P.Q. at 686-87.
55 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
56
 Pforzheimer, supra note 21, at 31.
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the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright holder is but an
incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself."57
Nevertheless, the treatment in Williams & Wilkens represents the
first conscious balancing between (1) the present and foreseeable
burdens on the copyright owner from a ruling of fair use, and (2) the
burden on the public's interest in the unhampered dissemination and
promotion of knowledge. The court's justification for including a
consideration of defendant's potential harm, as well as the public's
harm in general, rested on its desire to do the least amount of harm
while Congress was considering a legislative solution."
The question remains whether the Williams & Wilkens ap-
proach will continue even after congressional action, and to what
extent the decision will affect fair use generally. It is submitted that
the balancing done by the reviewing court should not be limited to a
" 'holding operation' in the interim period before Congress enacts its
preferred solution."" Instead, future applications of the doctrine of
fair use should always consciously weigh the potential harm to the
public interest if infringement would otherwise be found. The very
design of fair use was to temper the statutory monopoly granted to
copyright owners in light of the public interest. 60 The copyright
monopoly was statutorily created to advance the public interest on
the basis of the economic reward theory.6 1 Such a statutory grant
should be revocable if its very aim—promotion of "the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts"—would be thwarted by a finding of
infringement in favor of the copyright owner. As such, the Court of
Claims in Williams & Wilkens correctly considered the potential
detriment to the public interest.
Clearly the Williams & Wilkens decision was simplified by
plaintiff's failure to make a detailed study of the actual effect of
photocopying on its business, and by its failure to refute defendant's
figures. 62 The more difficult situation will arise when both parties
introduce their own experts, both sides demonstrating much harm in
the event of an adverse ruling. As a result of Williams & Wilkens
57
 Berlin v. B.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F,2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Mazer
v, Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948). "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration." 334 U.S. at 158.
9g
 487 F.2d at 1354, 1359. In a similar case, where the technology of community antenna
television (CATV) systems outpaced the 1909 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court declined to
render a compromise solution to accommodate the various competing interests of copyright,
communications, and antitrust policy. Instead the Court deferred to Congress the task of
devising a proper compensatory scheme for copyright owners. Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968), The case was thus ultimately decided on
the basis of strained interpretations of words in the outdated Copyright Act: "We must read
the statutory language of 60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change," Id. at 396.
See also id. at 398-402.
59
 487 F,2d at 1363.
6°
 Pforzheimer, supra note 21, at 31.
61 347 U.S. at 219.
62
 487 F.2d at 1358.
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the procedure would appear to include a weighing of ail five factors
comprising fair use, with the end result as unpredictable as ever.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that courts in the future will pay
particular attention to the underlying tension between economic
reward and unhampered dissemination of knowledge. As such, any
claims on either side can no longer expect to have the benefit of
inferred detriment, but should be able to substantiate any claims
with proof. Such proof, however, is often unreliable and difficult to
obtain, and the stringency of the proof requirements has yet to be
tested.
In conclusion, as a result of Williams & Wilkens, certain
photocopying of copyrighted journal articles will be permitted as a
fair use, despite the literal language of section 1 of the Copyright
Act.
The factors used in applying fair use are now five-fold: (1) the
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and the substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the effect of the use '
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work; and
(5) the detrimental effect to the public interest of promoting "the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."
The first four factors represent the traditional judicial standards
of fair use. Williams & Wilkens modified this traditional approach
by adding the fifth factor, thereby consciously balancing the compet-
ing interests of economic reward and unhampered dissemination of
knowledge. The decision further modified the traditional approach
by indicating that the burden of proof, with respect to the fourth
factor; may in the future be placed on the plaintiff instead of on the
defendant.
MARC R. K. BUNGEROTH
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shall mill such matter M the rates provided under this submatlon unles he flies mousey with the Pastel &Ryles a written aquae for
perininlan to mill Metter it such rota . '
in accordance with da provisions of this 
	  I haray request permission to meil the publimtion rnnet! In Item 1 m Ohs Induced pettege
rein presently euthorised by 39 U.S. C. 39211
.	 l„d Cil•.40 adItor, pubWIthar. boilrrt. manager, or ownrl
I S. FDR COMPLET ION	 O PRO IT ORGAN IZATIONS ORGA O2ATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES paragon 112.1 2 „ PottalMarary
(Cheek ant)
This purpom, function, and nonprofit mann at this,--, Hem not dumped 	 y-i. Hem changed during	 (If chan pd, pubiesher mat
argent...Von end the exempt MMus for Padova,
	 "during preceding	 " preceding 12 months 	 submit arpfananon of Mange
liaaa to ad00614	 12 month.	 aide 1110 Statement.)
11. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION
AVERAGE NO, COPIES
EACH ISSUE DURING
PRECEDING 12 MONTHS
ACTUAL NUMBER OF COPIES OP
BINDLE 'ISSUE PUBLISHED NBA R..
EST TO PILING DATE
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED Met PPM Map 1500 1250
11, PAID CIRCULATION
1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS Ale0 CARRIERS, STREET
VENDORS AND COUNTER BALES 50 50
2. MAIL 1UNSCRIPT1ONS 900 927
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION 950 977
D. F
1. SAMPLES,
REE DISTRUSUTION EY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS
COMPLIMENTARY, ANO OTHER FREE COPIES 150 L51
2. COPIES DISTRIBUTED TO NEWS AGENTS, RUT NOT BOLO 0 0
E, TOTAL DIST RIBUTION Own of C and D) 1100 1178
F. OFFICE USE, Lest-oven, UNACCOUNTED. SPOILED AFTER
PRINTING 400 72
G. TOTAL Mon of BR la-Moored toed nee pew rail SAD. bt A) 15 0 1	 0
► (	 of	 tot, pa	 r, or mere)
II:Mill). thlt n ee statements nude by me sbove ers Mart ad cerapaa. 	 k ,	 / \	 5,3/......./
PB Faros 3526 July 1971
